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19791 NOTES
values sought to be protected by the drafters. Any lessening of
the present requirements will only serve to undermine fourth
amendment guarantees in the name of administrative effi-
ciency. At the least, the instant case should serve as a mini-
mum standard by which any further balancing is to be mea-
sured.
Rebecca L. Hudsmith
ABROGATION OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BAR IN CASES OF
DISPARATE RISKS
Justifications of the doctrine of contributory negligence'
rely upon various theories - causation, assumption of risk,
deterrence, apportionability of damages, and equity. Of all the
rationales articulated to justify the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the most fundamental is derived from public policy
-the law will not protect a person who does not protect him-
self.3 That is to say, the duty of care for others manifestly
should be no higher than the duty of self-protection.' Despite
the apparent soundness of this proposition, its result is some-
times a windfall of nonliability for a negligent defendant.5
1. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff is denied recovery
when his own unreasonable conduct, combined with that of the defendant, culminated
in the injury. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 233 (1908). The
doctrine was first articulated in Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809),
in which the plaintiff ran into a pole which the defendant had negligently laid across
the road. Had the plaintiff not been "riding violently," he could have avoided the
injury. The court refused to grant recovery saying: "One person being in fault will not
dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself." Id. at 927.
2. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS § 65 (1971); Bohlen, supra note 1, at 233; Lowndes, Contributory Negligence,
22 GEo. L.J. 674, 674-85 (1934).
3. Lowndes, supra note 2, at 681. The author describes this explanation as "the
archaic assumption of the individualism of the common'law, which required of every
tub that it stand upon its own bottom." Id.
4. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 254. "To hold otherwise would . . . rob of self-
reliance, and . . . enervate and emasculate [plaintiffs] . . . by removing from them
all responsibility for their own safety." Id. at 254-55.
5. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3, 4
(1927). Green comments that much can be said against the harshness of the contribu-
tory negligence bar, "because it throws the whole risk on the plaintiff, while it lets the
defendant, also a wrongdoer, go free." Id. at 5.
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The traditional contributory negligence doctrine not only
fails to consider the proportional fault attributable to each of
the parties, but also does not properly take into account the
allocation of risks between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Although any negligent conduct may create a risk of harm to
someone, it is the divergence in the degree and nature of the
respective risks to which the plaintiff and the defendant are
exposed which characterizes a disparate risk situation. In the
disparate risk situation the defendant is engaged in an activity
which by its very nature creates a risk of injury to the plaintiff
far greater than the risk imposed on the defendant by the same
activity. While the plaintiff's negligence endangers only him-
self, the defendant's negligence endangers all those around
him.' As the allocation of risk becomes more disparate, the
inequity produced by the contributory negligence bar assumes
particularly harsh proportions. It is submitted that the Louis-
iana courts have seized upon such instances of disparity and
have utilized duty/risk analysis to remove selectively the con-
tributory negligence bar.
Illustrative of this selective abrogation of the contributory
negligence defense are decisions rendered in two recent cases.
In Boyer v. Johnson,7 the defendant employer hired a minor to
drive a delivery truck in violation of the applicable child labor
statutes.' Five days after the illegal employment began, the
minor was killed when he lost control of the vehicle while mak-
ing deliveries. The court developed the defendant employer's
ambit of duty by deriving a standard of care from the child
labor statutes. Further, the court determined that an injury
caused by the negligence of the minor was a risk included
within the employer's scope of duty. As a result, the contribu-
tory negligence of the minor was held to be immaterial to the
determination of liability. Similarly, in Baumgartner v. State
6. This has been termed a lack of mutuality of risks. See Comment, The Last
Clear Chance Doctrine in Louisiana-An Analysis and Critique, 27 LA. L. Rav. 269,
*275 (1967).
7. 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
8. LA. R.S. 23:161(10) (Supp. 1976) prohibits the employment of a minor."as
driver of any motor vehicle used for commercial or industrial purposes." LA. R.S.
23:163 (1950) prohibits the employment of a minor under 16 years of age to work in
connection with power-driven machinery.
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Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,9 the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence was held to be unavailable to the negligent
motorist who struck the plaintiff pedestrian as he crossed the
street within the boundaries of a crosswalk. Although both the
motorist and the pedestrian were negligently inattentive, the
court found the duty to anticipate and protect against the neg-
ligence of the pedestrain to be within the standard of care of
the motorist. Consequently, the defense of contributory negli-
gence was abrogated in motorist/pedestrian cases.
For jurisprudential perspective, the traditional treatment
of issues of delictual liability arising in child labor and motor-
ist/pedestrian cases will be examined. These treatments will
then be compared with the court's newly evolving approach to
the contributory negligence doctrine.
Minors Employed in Violation of Child Labor Laws and the
Contributory Negligence Bar
A penal statute prohibiting child labor may be utilized by
the court to impose an analogous civil duty upon the em-
ployer.'0 Liability is incurred when a risk within the ambit of
the statutorily-derived duty materializes to cause injury to a
member of the class that the statute was designed to protect.
Distinct from his statutory standard of care, the employer has
a nonstatutory duty, the ambit of which includes a separate set
of risks.
In Alexander v. Standard Oil of Louisiana," the supreme
court directed its attention to a formulation of the statutory
duty imposed on an employer who hired a minor in violation
of a statute which made it unlawful to employ any child under
fourteen years of age in certain occupations. The plaintiff,
illegally employed as a rivet heater, was injured when he fell
from his employer's scaffold to the ground. The court con-
cluded that the statute created a duty designed to prevent
9. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
10. See Weber v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 273 So. 2d 30 (La. 1973); Laird v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257
La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1971); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus
American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. Rav. 363, 373-79 (1970).
11. 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916).
12. 1908 La. Acts, No. 301.
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injury to minors of certain ages. Moreover, the employer's vio-
lation of the statute was held to be the legal cause of the
minor's injury.
Although the minor in Alexander was not contributorily
negligent, dictum in the opinion indicates that the court was
willing to include within the employer's standard of care the
duty to protect the minor from his own negligent behavior. The
court stated: "The reason children are forbidden to be em-
ployed in dangerous occupations being that they are presumed
to be incapable of taking care of themselves, it would seem to
be illogical to hold them responsible for their negligence."' 3
However, the lack of negligence of the Alexander minor made
this an improper case in which to rule on the availability of the
contributory negligence defense to relieve an employer who had
breached his statutory duty.
The supreme court defined the ambit of the nonstatutory
duty of employers in Flores v. Steeg Printing and Publishing
Co." This nonstatutory duty exists in the absence of, or in
supplement to, an employer's statutory duty towards a minor
employee. The Flores minor employee was not within the statu-
torily prohibited age group and consequently was not a mem-
ber of the class protected by the child labor statute.'5 The non-
statutory duty required only that the employer instruct and
inform the minor concerning the dangers inherent in his em-
ployment which the minor could not be presumed to appreciate
or comprehend. The. court held that contributory negligence
would be a valid defense to liability based on a breach of the
nonstatutory duty.'1
13. 140 La. at 68, 72 So. at 811. See Malone, supra note 10, at 367.
14. 142 La. 1068, 78 So. 119 (1918).
15. Flores involved Act 301 of 1908, which prohibited the employment of minors
under 14 years of age and required the employer to obtain a certificate of age prior to
employing a minor between the ages of 14 and 16. The minor in Flores was over 14
years of age, thus his employment was not prohibited. Though the employer neglected
to obtain the certificate of age, the purpose of that requisite was obviously only to
ascertain that the prospective employee was over 14. Thus, the Flores case represents
the nonstatutory duty of the employer. Act 301 of 1908 is the predecessor of the modern
child labor provision, LA. R.S. 23:163 (1950). The latter provision was violated by the
defendant in the instant case'of Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
16. In Flores the court relied on the lack of legislative intent to remove the
contributory negligence bar as a defense to a breach of the nonstatutory duty of the
employer. The court stated: "It may be presumed that the legislature felt that children
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Misinterpreting the Flores decision and ignoring'
Alexander, the First Circuit in Jones v. Insurance Co. of North
America 7 applied the Flores nonstatutory duty to an employer
who violated the applicable child labor statute. The minor in
Jones was injured while driving the employer's tractor in the
scope of his employment. Since he was under sixteen years of
age, his employment in connection with power-driven machi-
nery was proscribed by statute. 18 The Jones court, incorrectly
utilizing the Flores nonstatutory standard of care, found no
breach of the employer's duty since the minor had been pro-
perly instructed and was cognizant of the inherent dangers of
his employment. The court clearly erred in applying the
"inform and instruct" nonstatutory duty to the employer in
Jones; it should have derived a broader ambit of duty because
of the statutory violation. The contributory negligence issue
was not reached, because the court found that the defendant
had not breached his duty towards the employee.
Boyer v. Johnson" presented the court with an opportunity
to delineate clearly the scope of the duty of an employer whose
violation of a child labor statute results in injury to a minor
employee." Influenced by the dictum in Alexander, the Boyer
court held that the employer's plea of contributory negligence
over 14 were capable of taking care of themselves. . . .The act does not provide
directly or by implication that contributory negligence of a child over 14 years of age
cannot be pleaded or shown." 142 La. at 1073, 78 So. at 121. Following the Flores
court's reasoning, an a contrario argument may be made that the same legislation did
implicitly make the contributory negligence defense unavailable when the prohibition
against the employment of minors under 14 years of age was violated. The Flores court
relied in part upon Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909). However, the
court did so improperly since the Darsam case dealt with the statutory duty of an
employer to a minor employee. Additionally, the Darsam court did not reach the
contributory negligence issue since there had been no breach of the employer's statu-
tory duty. See note 49, infra, and accompanying text.
17. 303 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
18. LA. R.S. 23:163(2) (1950) states: "No minor under the age of sixteen shall be
employed, permitted or suffered to work. . . [iun, about, or in connection with power-
driven machinery."
19. 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
20. The defendant employer hired young Boyer to drive a delivery truck, al-
though such employment was a violation of LA. R.S. 23:161(10) (Supp..1976), which
prohibits the employment of a minor "[a]s a driver of any motor vehicle used for
commercial or industrial purposes." On the fifth day of the illegal employment, Boyer
was killed when he lost control of the vehicle while making deliveries. The court
assumed that the accident was caused by the minor's inability to handle the vehicle.
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as a defense had to be rejected because the statutory duty was
designed to protect against the youth, inexperience, and rela-
tive lack of judgment of the minor." The Boyer court thus
defined the ambit of the statutory duty of the employer in such
a way as to remove the contributory negligence bar in cases of
violations of child labor statutes which result in injury to a
minor employee.
In Boyer, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the posi-
tion already accepted in a majority of other states, that the
contributory negligence of the minor is not a defense to a viola-
tion of child labor statutes." Moreover, Boyer is consistent with
the holding in Flores and the dictum in Alexander concerning
the contributory negligence bar: the contributory negligence
defense is permitted in the context of the employer's nonstatu-
tory duty; but it is impermissible when the statutory duty is
involved.
The Motorist/Pedestrian Accident and the Contributory
Negligence Bar
While uncertainty had surrounded the availability of the
contributory negligence bar in child labor injury cases before
Boyer, the contributory negligence of the pedestrian, until re-
cently, had been widely acknowledged as a valid defense. 3
21. 360 So. 2d at 1169.
22. See, e.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920); Boyles
v. Hamilton, 235 Cal. App. 2d 492, 45 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1965); Dusha v. Va. & Rainy
Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920); Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124
N.E. 101 (1919); Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 A. 642 (1907);
Pinoza v. N. Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473, 140 N.W. 84 (1913); W. MALONE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (1951); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at
425-26; 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 526, Comment (b) (1958).
23. Biagi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 151 La. 925, 92 So. 387 (1922) (plaintiff's
contributory negligence barred recovery); Ortego v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
295 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 800 (La. 1974) (pedestrian
contributorily negligent, no recovery); Glatt v. Hinton, 205 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967) (pedestrian contributorily negligent, last clear chance doctrine inapplica-
ble); Ingram v. McCorkle, 121 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (pedestrian contribu-
torily negligent, but defendant had the last clear chance); Breaux v. Barichnivich, 49
So. 2d 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (pedestrian contributorily negligent, but defendant
had the last Zlear chance). Even cases which recognized a "higher duty" of care to the
motorist also pointed out that the pedestrian's contributory negligence was still rele-
vant. Accord Mequet v. Algiers MFG. Co., 147 La. 364, 84 So. 904 (1920). The Mequet
court made it clear that the pedestrian was not "to be excused for failing to use his
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However, the pedestrian had often recovered in spite of his
negligence under the doctrine of last clear chance." That doc-
trine allows the contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if
it appears that the defendant might have avoided the injury to
the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. 5
The last clear chance doctrine is primarily applied to cases
in which the plaintiff assumes a position of helplessness." In
instances of "discovered peril" the defendant who recognizes
the helpless position of the plaintiff in time toavoid the injury
is considered to have the last clear chance.17
The defendant is also considered to have the last clear
chance in situations of "apparent peril." In these cases the
defendant's last clear chance is based on the assumption that,
had the defendant exercised reasonable care, he would have
recognized the helplessness of the plaintiff in time to avoid the
injury.3
In the motorist/pedestrian cases, however, the most often
encountered situation is one in which the pedestrian's peril is
caused by his inattention rather than his helplessness. If the
motorist was cognizant of the inattention of the plaintiff pedes-
trian in time to avoid the injury, it is still possible to say that
the motorist had the last clear chance and, hence, that the
own senses to avoid being injured." Id. at 365, 84 So. at 905.
24. Cases in which the pedestrian was contributorily negligent and the motorist
had the last clear chance are: Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938); Taylor
v. Kendall, 162 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Ingram v. McCorkle, 121 So. 2d
303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Deck v. Page, 77 So. 2d 209 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955);
Prine v. Continental S. Lines, 71 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Moore v. NOLA
Cabs, Inc., 70 So. 2d 404 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Breaux v. Barichnivich, 49 So. 2d
651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
25. See Comment, supra note 6, at 273, in which the author indicates the near
exclusive application of the last clear chance doctrine to traffic and transportation
cases. See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 2214; James, Last Clear
Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE. L.J. 704 (1938); MacIntyre, The Rationale
of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1940).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1964).
27. Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935); Vail v. Spampinato, 108
So.2d 262 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958); Comment, supra note 6, at 281.
28. The Louisiana Supreme Court first adopted this "apparent peril" doctrine
in Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938). See also Taylor v. Kendall, 162
So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Moore v. NOLA Cabs, Inc., 70 So. 2d 404 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1954); Breaux v. Barichnivich, 49 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950); Cox v.
Gross, 47 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950); Neyrey v. Maillet, 21 So. 2d 158 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1945).
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negligent plaintiff may recover.29
On the other hand, when both motorist and pedestrian are
inattentive and the motorist is unaware of the pedestrian's
peril, most courts refuse to apply the last clear chance doc-
trine. These courts reason that either party, had he been at-
tentive, could have avoided the injury; thus, the defendant
cannot be held to have had the last clear chance.3
In order to allow the inattentive pedestrian to recover de-
spite his contributorily negligent conduct, one approach taken
by Louisiana courts is to extend the apparent peril doctrine of
last clear chance to cases in which the pedestrian's peril results
from inattention rather than helplessness. Thus, where both
parties are inattentive, the court may find that the defendant
motorist had the last clear chance to avoid the injury since, had
he been attentive, he would have discovered the pedestrian's
peril (inattention) in time to avoid the injury.32 The court sim-
ply refuses to consider that the pedestrian might have had the
29. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 480 (1964). The Restatement allows
the use of the last clear chance doctrine to aid the inattentive plaintiff only in the
"discovered peril" situation. That is, the defendant must have recognized the plain-
tiff's inattention in time for the defendant to have acted to prevent the harm.
30. See, e.g., Dyerson v. Union Pac. R.R., 74 Kan. 528, 87 Pac. 680 (1906); Glatt
v. Hinton, 205 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d
294, 400 P.2d 12 (1965); Hester v. Watson, 74 Wash. 2d 924, 448 P.2d 320 (1968).
Harper and James in their treatise on torts indicate that a large majority of courts have
refused to apply the last clear chance doctrine where both parties are negligently
inattentive but the defendant would have discovered plaintiff's peril had the defendant
exercised reasonable care. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at § 22.13 n.4. Louisiana
courts appear to fall in this category. But see text at notes 32-33, infra.
31. However, the Missouri humanitarian doctrine, an extension of the last clear
chance doctrine, allows the inattentive plaintiff to recover in this situation. Perkins v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 340 Mo. 868, 102 S.W. 2d 915 (1937); Burke v.
Pappus, 316 Mo. 1235, 293 S.W. 142 (1927); Bechtenwald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 121
Mo. App, 595, 97 S.W. 557 (1906). Coulson, Last Clear Chance - Humanitarian
Doctrine in Missouri, 6 KAN. CITy L. REV. 235 (1938). The author comments that: "The
cases in Missouri allow the plaintiff to recover in spite of his continuing, concurrent,
contributory negligence, when that negligence is exactly equivalent to the defendant's
negligence-i.e., failure to keep a proper lookout." Id. at 245. See generally Gaines,
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. REV. 113 (1934); Otis, The
Humanitarian Doctrine, 46 AM. L. REv. 381 (1912); McCleary, The Basis of the Hu-
manitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo. L. REV. 56 (1940).
32. Guilbeau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 So. 2d 600 (La. 1976); Belshe v. Gant,
235 La. 17, 102 So. 2d 477 (1958); Ingram v. McCorkle, 121 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960); Deck v. Page, 77 So. 2d 209 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955); Moore v. NOLA Cabs,
Inc., 70 So. 2d 404 (La. App. Orl Cir. 1954).
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last clear chance. This application of the last clear chance doc-
trine, which allows the contributorily negligent pedestrian to
recover when in fact either party might have had the last clear
chance, led one writer to question whether the court had
"placed the contributory negligence of the pedestrian on the
shelf" in pedestrian injury cases.3"
In several instances, however, the Louisiana courts have in
fact considered whether the inattentive plaintiff had the last
clear chance, contravening the intent of the last clear chance
doctrine by allowing it to be used as a "two-edged sword"
which defendant as well as plaintiff may wield. This approach
to the last clear chance doctrine has been utilized in several
motorist/pedestrian cases.34 Thus, the inattentive pedestrian
is denied recovery as a result of a finding that it was the plain-
tiff who had the last clear chance to avoid his own injury. This
involves an incorrect application of the last clear chance doc-
trine which developed as a plaintiffs tool, a means by which
the plaintiff could avoid the harsh contributory negligence
bar."5
The supreme court was presented with the inattentive
motorist/inattentive pedestrian situation in Baumgartner v.
State Farm Mutual. 31 The Fourth Circuit, applying the doc-
33. Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term
-Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 19 LA. L. REv. 334, 340 (1959). The case
referred to is Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17, 102 So. 2d 477 (1958), in which an inattentive
pedestrian was struck by an inattentive motorist. Through the application of the
"apparent peril" doctrine of Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938), to the
inattentive pedestrian plaintiff, the contributory negligence of the pedestrian became
irrelevant. A similar interpretation of the doctrine of Jackson was made in Law v.
Osterland, 3 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941), and commented upon in Malone, The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term-Torts and Workmen's
Compensation, 4 LA. L. REv. 209, 211 (1942). See Comment, supra note 6, at 283 n.57,
in which it is indicated that "if the full import of Jackson were accepted, that decision
would dissolve the defense of contributory negligence in these cases."
34. Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595, 60 So. 2d 4 (1952); Ortego
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 So. 2d 800 (La. 1974); Kraft v. U. Koen and Co. Inc., 188 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966); Comment, supra note 6, at 290.
35. Although the use of the last clear chance doctrine as a defendant's doctrine
is conceptually incorrect, the practical effect to the plaintiff is identical to that created
when the last clear chance doctrine is not applied at all. That is, the plaintiff's recovery
is barred by his contributory negligence.
36. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978). Although there were indications that the pedes-
trian might have been somewhat intoxicated, the court found that the pedestrian was
19791
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trine of last clear chance as a "two-edged sword," had found
that the pedestrian had the last clear chance and was therefore
barred from recovering by his contributory negligence.37 Rather
than attempt to untangle the twisted intricacies of the use (or
misuse) of the last clear chance doctrine, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that contributory negligence is unavailable
as a defense to a negligent motorist; and hence, the doctrine of
last clear chance no longer applies to motorist/pedestrian
cases.38 The court stated:
Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of "last clear
chance" has no application in absolving a motorist from
liability when he negligently strikes a pedestrian. In the
city a motorist is obligated to maintain a lookout for pe-
destrians at crosswalks at all times. If he fails to see a
pedestrian in a position of peril when he should have, the
motorist is at fault and is responsible. . . . The motorist
cannot escape liability by proving that the pedestrian,
admittedly in peril because of his own negligence, could
have avoided injury more quickly than the motorist.3
The court indicated its express disapprdval of the "two-
edged sword" application of the last clear chance doctrine."0
Particularly where there is a lack of mutuality of risks, the
court pointed out that the last clear chance doctrine should not
be used as a weapon in the hands of of the defendant.4 Focus-
ing on the disparity of risks to the parties, the court charged
the motorist with a higher standard of care towards the pedes-
trian than that which had previously been imposed in motor-
ist/pedestrian cases. 2
neither too drunk nor too intoxicated to remove himself from the path of the motorist's
vehicle. Thus, the plaintiff was not helpless, but was oblivious to the vehicle as it
approached him.
37. 346 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
38. The court made it clear that a motorist may not assert the contributory
negligence of the pedestrian: "[the motorist] should not be able to escape responsibil-
ity for injury to the pedestrian by pleading the latter's negligence." 356 So. 2d at 406.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 406 n.8.
41. Id.
42. The court expressly approved the Missouri humanitarian doctrine in its ap-
plication to motorist/pedestrian cases. Id. at 405 n.6. The Missouri humanitarian
doctrine imposes a high standard of care upon the motorist by extending the last clear
[Vol. 39
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The Redefinition of the Defendant's Duty
Although the Baumgartner court relied on a statute as a
collateral source of the motorist's duty,43 the defendant's duty
was primarily not statutorily derived. In Boyer, on the other
hand, the employer's duty was drawn wholly by analogy to the
child labor statute. Regardless of the source of the defendant's
duty, the approach taken in defining the ambit of that duty
was identical." In both Boyer and Baumgartner the court re-
moved the contributory negligence bar to recovery by expand-
ing the ambit of defendant's duty. This expanded duty requires
the defendant to anticipate the possibility of plaintiffs negli-
gence and to exercise due care to avoid injury even to a negli-
gent plaintiff.
The Boyer court worked this expansion of duty by analo-
gizing to statutes which prohibit the employment of minors in
certain occupations. A defendant employer's duty is to antici-
pate that minors are likely to be injured in the course of such
employments due to their own negligence." By the act of em-
chance doctrine to make it available to the plaintiff pedestrian in the inattentive
motorist/inattentive pedestrian case. See note 31, supra. Because the Baumgartner
decision removes the contributory negligence bar to recovery, thus making the last
clear chance doctrine irrelevant, the Louisiana Supreme Court has in fact gone beyond
the confines of the humanitarian doctrine.
43. 356 So. 2d at 404 n.3. LA. R.S. 32:212(A) (1950) provides that, in the absence
of operative traffic control signals, motorists must yield to pedestrians crossing the
roadway within a crosswalk when "the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon
which the vehicle is travelling or when the pedestrian is approaching closely from the
opposite half of the roadway [so] as to be in danger."
44. See Hill v. Lundin and Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972)
(duty/risk analysis in the nonstatutory context); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v.
American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962) (duty/risk analysis in the
statutory duty context); Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dia-
logues on Hill v. Lundin and Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. Rv. 1 (1973).
45. Justice Tate, deriving the defendant employer's duty from the applicable
child labor statutes, indicated what that duty encompasses. "In enacting the child
labor statutes, the legislature imposed on employers certain duties, in order to protect
children from their own youth and inexperience and from other risks of employment,"
360 So. 2d at 1166. "The defendant in this case, who violated laws which sought
precisely to protect Johnny from his own youth, inexperience, and relative lack of
judgment, cannot be heard to assert that these very defects in Johnny's character
caused the accident." 360 So. 2d at 1169. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 65,
indicating that child labor statutes have often been construed to place the responsibil-
ity on the employer to protect the class of plaintiffs against their own negligence. See
notes 21-22, supra, and accompanying text.
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ploying a minor to perform the proscribed activity, the defen-
dant's breach of the duty is consummated and the threshold
of liability exceeded. Since the employer's breach of duty is
completed by initially employing the minor, proof of the em-
ployer's exercise of reasonable care once employment com-
menced is no defense."4
In a significant footnote, Justice Tate gave some indica-
tion that the expanded duty of the employer of a minor may
even include certain risks to the employee which occur outside
of the scope of employment. 7 In Darsam v. Kohlmann48 the
court had denied recovery to the minor based on a finding that
the minor employee had removed himself from the scope of
employment at the time of the injury. 4" Justice Tate, comment-
ing on the Darsam holding, stated: "We might disagree with
the Darsam court that the additional risk was not within the
statutory protection . 8... -0 Thus, the Boyer court indicated
a willingness to expand an employer's duty to include risks
incurred by a minor employee when he steps outside of the
scope of employment. However, the extent to which the duty
of the employer encompasses these outside-of-employment
risks has not yet been delineated by the court.
The ambit of the defendant motorist's duty in
Baumgartner was also drawn so as to encompass risks created
in part by the negligence of pedestrian plaintiff.51 A motorist
46. The employer in Boyer ascertained that the minor had a driver's license and
rode with the boy in the delivery truck for two days to supervise and observe his ability
to drive. For the two succeeding days, the employer followed in another vehicle while
the minor drove the delivery truck. Based on these precautions taken by the employer,
the court of appeal found the defendant "void of any actionable substandard conduct."
Boyer v. Johnson, 350 So. 2d 961, 964 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 360 So. 2d 1164
(La. 1978). The supreme court, however, found "instructing and informing" the minor
to be no substitute for compliance with the duty derived from the regulatory statute.
360 So. 2d at 1168.
47. 360 So. 2d at 1170 n.4.
48. 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909).
49. A boy below the age of 12 was employed to work in a factory in violation of
1906 La. Acts, No. 34. The minor left a position of relative safety to which he had been
assigned and was subsequently injured. The Darsam court interpreted the action of
leaving his station as having taken the minor outside of the scope of employment.
Hence, the risk of harm was not within the ambit of the statutory or the nonstatutory
duty of the employer. 123 La. at 172, 48 So. at 784.
50. 360 So. 2d at 1170 n.4.
51. As the Baumgartner court expressed the defendant's duty: "The operator
of a motor vehicle, a dangerous instrumentality, has the constant duty to watch out
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is charged with "the constant duty to watch out for the possible
negligent acts of the pedestrians and avoid injuring them."5
Moreover, a motorist "should not be able to escape responsibil-
ity for injury to the pedestrian by pleading the latter's negli-
gence. '" 1 Thus, the Baumgartner court applied to the motor-
ist/pedestrian case a technique similar to that used in the
Boyer decision. An enlargement of the defendant's duty so as
to remove the contributory negligence defense resulted in the
imposition of liability on the defendant upon a one-step deter-
mination that defendant was negligent.5'
The Rationale Supporting the Redefinition of Duty
The Baumgartner court saw the defendant's higher duty
of care as resulting from the disparity of risks borne by the
motorist and the pedestrian.55 The motorist's utilization of the
for the possible negligent acts of pedestrains and avoid injurying them. . . .A higher
standard of care than that required of pedestrians is imposed upon the motorist .. "
356 So. 2d at 406. Without going to the extent of removing the contributory negligence
bar, prior Louisiana courts have expressed a similar "higher duty" of the motorist. See
Duffy v. Hickey, 151 La. 274, 91 So. 733 (1922); Mequet v. Algiers Mfg. Co., 147 La.
364, 84 So. 904 (1920); Woodard v. Burkes, 135 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961);
Prine v. Continental S. Lines, 71 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Norwood v- Bahm,
129 So. 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930).
52. Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400, 406 (La.
1978).
53. Id.
54. The Baumgartner court stressed that the defendant motorist must first be
determined to have been negligent, i.e., to incur liability the motorist must
"negligently strike a pedestrian." 356 So. 2d at 406. "It must be noted, however, that
a motorist who exercises all reasonable care to protect a pedestrian, who nonetheless
suffers injury, is not at fault." Id.
55. 356 So. 2d at 405. See also Woodard v. Burks, 135 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961), in which the court stated: "It is logical that the motorist, as against the
pedestrian, bears the greater burden of. .. caution . ..; for it is the motorist who
has the power, because of the dangerous instrument which he controls, to reduce the
status of a pedestrian to that of a statistic in a split second." 135 So. 2d at 336-37.
The lack of mutuality of risks to the motorist and the pedestrian respectively,
"[w/hile not outwardly recognized by the judiciary, . . . explains why extreme care
in the operation of dangerous instrumentalities . . . is demanded." Comment, supra
note 6, at 275. Leon Green describes the motorist/pedestrian relationship as follows:
It is [the motorist] who is enjoying the ride or making the profit from the
operation of such machines as make the highway perilous. While his activity is
lawful ..., yet he is not on equal footing with the plaintiff he hurts; he enjoys
every advantage. He runs little risk of hurt from plaintiff's negligence, either
physically or financially; plaintiff has an excess of both risks." Green, supra note
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automobile creates a risk of collision in which great harm would
befall the pedestrian, while little financial or physical harm
would be likely to occur to the motorist." Moreover, the pedes-
trian's activity only endangers himself, while the motorist's
action of driving the automobile creates a risk of harm to all
pedestrians around him. 7
An employer in a Boyer situation creates a similar dispar-
ity of risks by employing a minor to work in a proscribed occu-
pation. Again, the defendant, furthering his own enterprise,
places the plaintiff in a position of great peril without incurring
any real risk to himself. While the minor poses little threat of
injury to the employer, the employer exposes the minor to risks
of great bodily harm. 58
The disparity of risks concept, which is also termed a lack
of mutuality of risks, has been present in the law of negligence
since the interjection into society of motorized instrumental-
ities in the nineteenth century. Before the advent of the train,
the trolley, and the automobile, the law of negligence was ap-
plied in the standard situation in which two persons were by
their activity mutually exposing each other to risks of acci-
dents. 9 However, the initial introduction of the dangerous in-
strumentality-the train-altered the allocation of risks to
the parties. Moreover, juries, responding to the inequitable dis-
5, at 32. "The motorist has chosen to make the streets unsafe .... [Hie
imposes the risk, why should he not bear the loss when it comes? Justice is at
her best here.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 29 COLUM. L. Rav. 255, 278 (1929).
56. Since the motorist is the beneficiary of the risk-creating activity of driving,
a type of enterprise theory of liability may be suggested. The motorist, if he desires to
drive and thus make the streets unsafe for pedestrians, must "pay his own way."
Harper and James, in their treatise on tort law, indicate that there is a "growing
tendency to accept the idea of social insurance, that where losses can be traced to a
given form of activity their cost should be distributed among those who benefit by that
activity." F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at § 22.14.
57. See note 55, supra.
58. See note 56, supra, for the enterprise theory of liability applied to the motor-
ist defendant. When the risk of harm created by the activity of driving materializes,
those engaged in the lawful activity of driving are liable. A fortiori, one engaged in an
activity proscribed by law in furtherance of his own enterprise, i.e., the employment
of minors in certain occupations, should be required to repair the injuries resulting
from risks created by that activity.
59. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151,
157 (1946).
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tribution of the risks, demanded "reparation of the intruding
railway which created dangers but was not exposed to the perils
of its own making." 0 The contributory negligence bar allowed
the courts to protect the "infant" industry from the wrath of
juries whose damage awards could have taxed the new activity
out of existence.6' The court made the policy judgment that the
activity which the defendant pursued was useful to society and
hence must be fostered in its growth. The determinative factors
in employing the contributory negligence bar were the utility
of the defendant's activity and the inability of that activity to
bear the cost of the risk. Thus, the disparity of risks and policy
considerations created the need for the courts to utilize the
contributory negligence bar as a tool to protect the new trans-
portation industries.2
In Boyer and Baumgartner, the court balanced the same
policy considerations, considered the same disparity of risks,
but concluded that the contributory negligence tool must now
be abandoned in order to protect the plaintiff. The unarticu-
lated policy judgment of the court recognizes that the defen-
dant's risk-creating activity is now in a better position to bear
the risk of harm which it creates. The automobile is no less
useful to society, but the phenomenon of insurance makes it
possible for the court to demand that automobile drivers bear
the risk which their activity creates. The automobile driver
who can pass the liability on to his insurance company absorbs
the loss more easily than the pedestrian. 3 In the same way, the
60. Id.
61. Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L.
REv. 125, 137 (1945).
62. Id. at 137-38.
63. Green, supra note 55, at 278. According to Green, the motorist:
can protect himself from financial hurt by a pittance, and as against the pedes-
trian at least, he runs little risk of suffering hurt either to his person or property.
His ability to afford the advantages of a motor implies a like ability to supply
protection against its hurts. In short, he imposes the risk, why should he not bear
the loss when it comes. The same economy is involved in compensating the hurt
individual who either supports a family or is supported by someone who does
as is involved in the employer-employee cases. Insurance is the best available
protection we have against the inevitable. The hurts and injuries of a motorized
society are largely of that type. Morality, economy, and justice all require the
person who creates hazards on a large scale to avail himself of the protection
insurance gives in behalf of his victims.
Id. at 278.
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employer who chooses to employ the minor in proscribed occu-
pations must bear the risk which that employment creates.
Again, the enterprise is quite able to bear the risk as a cost of
doing business, while the individual employee cannot easily
absorb the accident cost. 4 Thus, the court imposed liability on
the party who was better able to bear the risk.
The prophylactic element of the court's decision in the
instant cases is related to the disparity of abilities of the parties
to prevent the harm. The Boyer court interpreted the child
labor statute as a legislative determination that minors in cer-
tain situations are incapable of protecting themselves. 5 The
employer who exercises due care by refusing to employ the
minor in proscribed activities is in a better position to prevent
the harm than the minor, who may find it difficult to protect
himself once the employment begins. Thus, there is a disparity
in the abilities of the parties to avert the harm." To achieve
64. The same justification lies behind the modern workmen's compensation stat-
utes. W. MALONE, supra note 22, at 33-34. The author discusses the cost of industrial
accidents in this way: "It is futile to dismiss this question with the observation that
the victim must shoulder his own accident costs. Seldom does the average worker have
accumulated savings sufficient to tide him over anything more than the most trivial
mishap." Id. at 33. Society has slowly come to realize that "industry should be required
in some way or another to bear at least a part of the risk it has created." Id. at 34.
Interestingly enough, initial statutory reforms which paved the way for modern work-
men's compensation legislation, involved a removal of the absolute contributory negli-
gence bar as one of the employer's defenses. Thus, these reforms shifted the cost of
industrial accidents to the employers by allowing the employee a tort recovery. See id.
at 28-31.
65. See note 45, supra.
66. Disparity of abilities may also be seen as the basis of the last clear chance
doctrine. Where both plaintiff and defendant are negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance allows plaintiff to recover due to the defendant's superior ability to avert the
harm. See note 25, supra. Assuming that the minor, once he is employed, will negli-
gently injure himself, the employer, by the exercise of reasonable care, should recog-
nize the minor's peril. Thus, one might say that the employer had the last clear chance
to avoid the injury all the way up to the point of its occurrence. The employer's last
clear chance would be based on his superior ability to avoid the injury by terminating
the minor's employment. However, duty/risk analysis may be used to articulate the
same notions. The end result is identical whether the contributory negligence bar is
removed through the use of the last clear chance doctrine or by utilizing duty/risk
analysis. Under the duty/risk approach, the defendant's duty includes the duty to
anticipate and protect the minor from his own negligent acts. For a good illustration
of the manner in which duty/risk analysis and the last clear chance doctrine can each
be used to make the contributory negligence of the plaintiff irrelevant, see Pence v.
Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976) (Dixon, J., concurring); Note, 37 LA. L. REv. 617
(1977).
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the prophylactic effect and prevent the recurrence of the in-
jury, the court imposed liability on the party who was best able
to reduce the risk of harm.
In the motorist/pedestrian situation the disparity in abili-
ties is less apparent than that evident in the employment of
minors in dangerous occupations. However, the party in control
of the instrumentality can fairly be charged with a greater
capacity to prevent the harm. In comparing the parties' rela-
tive abilities to avoid a motorist/pedestrian accident, it is evi-
dent that the motorist can change the speed and direction of
his vehicle with more quickness than the pedestrian can muster
to escape the oncoming car.
Thus, the following factors combined to bring about the
abrogation of the contributory negligence bar in the instant
cases:
(1) The defendant's conduct created the disparity of
risks and abilities between plaintiff and defendant.
(2) The defendant was better able to bear and distribute
the risk.
(3) Imposition of liability upon the defendant was more
likely to achieve the desired prophylactic effect and to
mitigate the likelihood of the recurrence of the injury."7
67. The above factors are also relevant to an inquiry for determining strict liabil-
ity. For example, the rationale of strict liability has been explained in terms of the one-
sidedness of the risk created by defendant's activity. The defendant is held strictly
liable because his activity creates an extreme disparity of risks. Void, West & Wolf,
Aircraft Operator's Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger Injury, 13 NEB. L.
BULL. 373, 380 (1935). To the extent that the plaintiff's negligence contributes to the
risk, one might question whether the expansion of defendant's duty in Baumgartner
and Boyer is akin to an imposition of strict liability. The humanitarian doctrine, which
the Baumgartner court expressly approved in its application to motorist/pedestrian
cases, has been called "a doctrine of absolute liability applied to a particular situation,
and embellished by a fine sounding term." McCleary, supra note 31, at 83. Another
issue to be addressed is whether the result in Baumgartner signals a movement toward
the imposition of strict liability for the operation of an automobile which was so
narrowly rejected in Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). For the
Baumgartner court, the determination of defendant's liability is predicated upon a
finding of negligence on the part of the defendant. However, the willingness of the
Baumgartner court to expand the ambit of the motorist's duty to include risks created
by the negligence of the plaintiff may portend an even further expansion of the duty
of the motorist in the future. The threshold of strict liability will be reached if the court
ultimately decides to impose upon motorists liability for harms resulting from the risks
created by their activity without an initial determination of the negligence of the
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Whether this set of factors is sufficient to justify the abolition
of the contributory negligence bar is open to dispute. There will
be those who agree with Chief Justice Sanders' dissenting view
in Baumgartner that such a "major revision of the law ...
should be based upon a careful study of the entire field of
delictual responsibility followed by legislative action." 8
Until the legislature acts to apportion recovery according
to proportionate fault, one can expect the court to continue to
regard the contributory negligence bar to recovery as being too
harsh to countenance in individual cases encountered in the
future. As such cases arise, the notions of risk disparity, risk
distribution, and relative ability to prevent the harm may Well
prove helpful in analyzing the results reached by the court.
Marie Roach Yeates
defendant driver. The logical conclusion of this development could entail the enact-
ment of no-fault legislation which has already found acceptance in other jurisdictions.
68. 356 So.2d 400, 407 (1978).
69. See, e.g., Outlaw v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1350 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978), in which a nine-year-old golfer was blinded by the defendant's golf ball. The
mature golfer apparently was aware that th boy was crouched behind his own golf bag,
slightly to the left of the defendant's drive line. The court indicated that the defen-
dant's duty included the duty to "anticipate that the nine-year-old might . . . leave
the protected cover . . . and place himself into the path of a possible bad shot .. ."
Id. at 1352. Although the boy was contributorily negligent, "his negligence cannot be
both the foreseen risk which imposes the duty on the mature golfer not to hit the ball
and at the same time a defense to an action for damages for breach of the mature
golfer's duty. The youngster's leaving a place of safety cannot both impose a duty and
excuse its breach." Id. at 1353. Thus, the Fourth Circuit avoided the harsh result of
the contributory negligence bar by expanding the defendant's ambit of duty to include
anticipating and guarding against the plaintiff's possible negligence. The activity of
driving a golf ball is a dangerous activity because it imposes a great risk of bodily harm
to others on the golf course. The disparity in the risks as between the driver of the ball
and the bystander is evident.
